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Religion and politics in Sub-
Saharan Africa
Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar*
There is a thriving literature of religious tracts in Africa. The few
formal bookshops, and the far more numerous market-stalls and
itinerant hawkers who sell books, offer for sale pamphlets and popular
works on religious subjects in every country of the continent, it would
seem. Some are theological inquiries into aspects of the Bible or the
Koran. Others contain moral lessons derived from these sacred books.
Perhaps the most common category, however, is testimonies of personal
religious experiences. Much of this literature hardly makes its way
outside Africa and is only rarely to be found in even the finest Western
academic libraries."
The most puzzling genre, at least for anyone educated in modern
Western academies of learning, is that of the numerous works on
witchcraft and other perceived forms of evil, sometimes in the form of
a description of a personal journey into a world of spirits. While many
pious works on Christianity on sale in Africa are authored by American
evangelicals and published in America, popular books on witchcraft
and mystical voyages are almost invariably written by Africans and
published locally. Similar material is circulated through churches,
sometimes in the form of video recordings. This is also true of African-
led churches in the diaspora, among African communities on other
continents. It is impossible to know with certainty how many people
give any credence to stories like these, but the indications are that very
many do so. Not only do pamphlets describing mystical journeys
appear to circulate in large numbers,# but such accounts may clearly
* Respectively a historian at the Afrika-Studiecentrum, Leiden, and a scholar of religion at
Utrecht and Leiden Universities, both in the Netherlands. We are grateful to numerous people
who have commented on earlier drafts of this article, notably during a presentation at the African
Studies Association of the USA annual conference in San Francisco in November  and at a
conference on religion and politics organised by the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, –
Oct. .
" The popular works referred to in this article (such as those by Kaniaki and Mukendi, Pianim,
and Okeke mentioned below) are taken from the authors’ own private collections, having been
bought in markets and shops in Africa. Even the excellent African Books Collective, the Oxford-
based concern which distributes books outside Africa on behalf of some fifty leading African
publishers, rarely handles the type of literature to which we refer.
# For example, D. D. Kaniaki and Evangelist Mukendi, Snatched from Satan’s Claws: an amazing
deliverance by Christ (Nairobi, ) is published in both English and Kiswahili. This text will be
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be situated within an older tradition of stories about witchcraft and
journeys into the underworld which is to be found in collections of
folklore and even in the literature of high culture.$ Studies of churches
and of healers in almost any part of Africa indicate that incidents of
perceived witchcraft and of shamanism or near-death experiences are
relatively common, and probably have been for as long as it is possible
to trace. Such evidence may be drawn not just from studies of the
pentecostal churches which have attracted so much scholarly interest of
late,% but also of many other sorts of church including African
independent congregations, of Muslim communities and of indigenous
religious traditions. Thus, the popular literature written by people
who claim to have experienced spiritual journeys or to have expert
knowledge of witchcraft is not, we believe, an ephemeral genre but
rather represents a modern form of an important tradition of mysticism
in Africa.
It is perhaps helpful to note that many such texts are treatises on evil.
They may be read as expressions of deep concern about the moral
confusion which reigns in societies where people are no longer able to
distinguish easily between that which is good and that which is evil. In
the considerable number of African countries in which political
institutions have largely broken down, religious discourse can be seen
as an attempted remedy by means of a reordering of power, as will be
discussed in due course. To this extent these popular religious texts
reflect the preoccupations of Africans concerning the way in which
power is exercised in their societies. If it is often difficult for analysts
operating in the Western academic tradition to penetrate the meaning
of such works, this is for reasons which, we will assert, derive from some
discussed in more detail below. A related discussion on popular literature is Michael Schatzberg,
‘Power, legitimacy and ‘‘democratisation’’ in Africa’, Africa, ,  (), –.
$ For a spiritual journey in the form of modern literature, see e.g. Amos Tutuola, My Life in
the Bush of Ghosts (London, ) and, more recently, Ben Okri, The Famished Road (London,
). A rare publication by a non-African with deep personal experience of the subject is Eric
de Rosny, Les yeux de ma che[ vre (Paris, ), which became a best-seller in Africa.
% A pioneer in this field is Paul Gifford, whose work has inspired a growing interest among
academics in the West. See Gifford, The Religious Right in Southern Africa (Harare, ) ; Christianity
and Politics in Doe’s Liberia (Cambridge, ) ; as well as two edited volumes, New Dimensions in
African Christianity (Nairobi, ), and The Christian Churches and the Democratisation of Africa
(Leiden, ). A number of African scholars have also written on this subject, particularly in
Ghana and Nigeria, but have attracted less international attention. See e.g. Matthews Ojo, ‘The
growth of campus Christianity and charismatic movements in western Nigeria ’ Ph.D., University
of London () ; Ojo, ‘Deeper life Christian Ministry : a case study of the charismatic
movements in western Nigeria ’, Journal of Religion in Africa,  (), – ; and ‘The
contextual significance of the charismatic movements in independent Nigeria ’, Africa,  (),
– ; Kingsley Larbi, ‘The development of Ghanaian Pentecostalism: a study of the
appropriations of the Christian gospel in twentieth century Ghana setting with special reference
to the Christ Apostolic Church, the Church of Pentecost and the International Central Gospel
Church’, Ph.D., University of Edinburgh ().
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common misapprehensions about the nature of religion and politics in
Africa south of the Sahara. Since the texts to which we refer are
concerned with power in African societies, or to be more exact, with the
dangers which can arise when power is not properly organised and
controlled, they can be considered a commentary on a world in which
power is seen as being too often an instrument of evil people who use
it to destroy peace and harmony. To that extent, they are also an
oblique criticism of government or of misgovernment. Hence they cast
an interesting light on the way in which religion and politics in Africa
act upon each other.
There is widespread evidence that many Africans today continue to
hold beliefs derived from traditional cosmologies which they apply to
their everyday activities, even when they live in cities and derive their
living from jobs in the civil service or the modern economic sector.&
Contrary to what an older generation of Western scholars was inclined
to believe, such views have hardly diminished with education. Religious
belief operates at every level of society in Africa. Popular priests and
prophets work in areas where the poor live, while the rich may have
their own more exclusive spiritual advisors. Some religious leaders
minister to both rich and poor. In most countries plural religious
allegiance is common at all levels of society, so that an individual may
be a member of several religious congregations simultaneously, and
in many parts of the continent may even practice religious rituals
regarded in the West as belonging to different systems of belief, such as
Christianity and Islam, or Christianity and ‘traditional ’ religion, or
Sufism and reformed Islam, as in Sudan.
The present article, then, is an attempt to sketch a theory which we
hope will clarify the relationship between religion and politics in Africa.
We propose to proceed by steps from a discussion of what religion is,
and how it may best be studied, to a brief analysis of a couple of popular
religious texts chosen by way of illustration, before passing on to some
further observations on the way in which power is organised and
perceived in various African societies. Our text has been written with
sub-Saharan Africa in mind, although it is possible that the theory
which we outline is at least partly applicable to North Africa, and
indeed some aspects may be of interest to observers of other parts of the
world, for reasons which should become clear. It has also drawn
examples mostly from the literature on Christianity rather than Islam
simply due to lack of knowledge on our part.'
& See e.g. Abdou Toure! and Yacouba Konate! , Sacrifices dans la ville : le citadin chez le divin en CoW te
d’Ivoire (Abidjan, ).
' On recent transformations of Muslim societies, see Louis Brenner (ed.), Muslim Identity and
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Since politics is generally supposed to be concerned with the
distribution of power in society, religious texts which discuss the latter
are at least implicitly political in nature. However, we emphatically do
not argue that the many popular texts about encounters with witches
or about hidden universes of evil are simple allegories, critiques of
politics written in code in order to avoid prosecution or other
retribution. That has become hardly necessary in the last ten years,
during which time most of Africa has acquired a remarkable press
freedom which removes most need for criticism of a government to be
oblique. It is rather that any discourse on the morality and organisation
of power, even if such a discourse is written in religious idiom, has
political implications in a continent where all power is widely believed
to have its ultimate origin in the same source, namely the invisible
world. Religious discourse thus has implications for states which
certainly cannot be described as weak or in crisis, like South Africa. But
the fact is that many African states do show symptoms of acute political
fragility and in some dramatic cases, such as Somalia, Congo, Sierra
Leone and many others, the conventional apparatus of the state
functions hardly or not at all. Again, for the sake of clarity, we will state
what we are not arguing: we do not contend that the emergence of new
religious forms or new religious tendencies, including those Muslim and
Christian movements sometimes labelled ‘ fundamentalist ’, is always a
response to what has often been described as state collapse. On the
contrary, it is clear that certain widespread religious trends, such as
Islamic renewal and pentecostal revival movements, affect many parts
of the world,( and in this sense Africa is merely undergoing a similar
experience to that of some other continents. What we do point out is
that such movements are not devoid of political significance in an
African context, where there are deeply rooted concepts of power
which tend to merge the religious and the political, and that such
movements acquire a specific public role when the institutions of state
have rotted away.
The short, highly readable religious texts which are so popular in
Africa are not, then, conscious or even unconscious attempts to
broadcast political messages in the conventional meaning of the word
‘politics ’. On the contrary, there is no reason to doubt that the authors
Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa (London, ), and Mervyn Hiskett, The Course of Islam in Africa
(Edinburgh, ).
( David Martin, Tongues of Fire: the explosion of protestantism in Latin America (Oxford, ), and
David Westerlund (ed.), Questioning the Secular State: the worldwide resurgence of religion in politics
(London, ).
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of such texts believe themselves to be recounting true stories or
discussing real occurrences, no matter how puzzling these may seem to
those who do not believe that witchcraft or journeys to the underworld
can possibly be real. Their meaning is to be sought less in a refined
deconstruction of their symbolism, although the symbols used are
indeed informative, than in considering how entire cultures come to
consider reality in specific ways, including in terms of interaction
between the visible and invisible forces which they believe to constitute
the world and to determine its evolution. In short, we believe that the
analysis of these religious texts should be based on one vital assumption:
that the authors intend what they write to be taken literally, however
unlikely it may seem.
 
The interpretation of popular religious literature (and, a fortiori, of
the oral expression of religion) in Africa poses problems for conventional
modes of analysing both politics and religion.
The disciplines most widely used for writing on public affairs in
Africa are political science and economics.) Neither of these two is
equipped to encompass the belief, so widespread in Africa, that there
exists a continuum between visible and invisible worlds, or that
mankind shares its environment with spirits of various types which
have a determining influence on the outcome of mundane transactions
and with which direct communication is possible. Western analysts
who attempt to study the role of religion in African politics often adopt
an institutional approach which can hardly consider how religious
ideologies come to have a bearing on the ways in which political power
is actually perceived and exercised.* The work of those historians who
have made the most interesting attempts to reconstitute past
relationships between religion and politics"! has made relatively little
impact on the literature on contemporary politics and public affairs.
An important exception, however, is a francophone school of political
science, strongly influenced by a wider literature of philosophy, history
) For a comprehensive survey, see Robert H. Bates, V. Y. Mudimbe and Jean O’Barr (eds.),
Africa and the Disciplines (Chicago and London, ).
* E.g. Jeff Haynes, Religion in Third World Politics (Boulder, ) ; Leonardo A. Villalon, Islamic
Society and State Power in Senegal: disciples and citizens in Fatick (Cambridge, ). A wide-ranging,
although now rather dated, survey is Terence Ranger, ‘Religious movements and politics in Sub-
Saharan Africa’, African Studies Review, ,  (), –.
"! E.g. T. O. Ranger and I. N. Kimambo (eds.), The Historical Study of African Religion (London,
) ; Françoise Raison-Jourde, Bible et pouvoir a[ Madgascar au XIXe sie[ cle (Paris, ).
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and anthropology, which has succeeded rather better than the
anglophone tradition of political science in incorporating religion in its
frame of analysis."" Meanwhile, the most influential of all economic
analysts of Africa, the World Bank, has incorporated certain insights
from political science into its own analysis, maintaining that the root
cause of Africa’s economic problems actually lies in the nature of the
continent’s political institutions and the political culture of the people
who officiate in them, or, in the World Bank’s formulation, in ‘a crisis
of governance’."# In recent years this has given rise to an extensive
literature on governance in Africa."$
If the study of African politics is mainly in the hands of political
scientists and economists, the academic study of religion in Africa,
meanwhile, is largely in the hands of anthropologists, the more so as the
influence of writers trained in the disciplines of theology, church studies
and the like has diminished in proportion as theology has lost the
central place it once had in Western academic curricula. Anthropology
was created as a formal intellectual discipline as a result of the
expansion of European interests in Africa and Asia particularly. The
earliest anthropologists of Africa were concerned above all to
systematise the indigenous practices and beliefs which flourished in
rural areas, where tradition was felt to exist at its most pure."% Many
classic anthropological texts were based on the study of local institutions
and cultures conceived of as traditional or closed systems which seemed
destined to be eroded by the forces of modernisation. This approach
continued to have a significant effect on anthropological views of
African religion for decades. Only in more recent times have
anthropologists studied the religious beliefs of Africans from a wider
perspective, incorporating into their field of study, for example, new
Christian communities,"& and extending their inquiries to the ways in
which religion and politics combine in contemporary Africa."'
"" Jean-François Bayart, L’Eo tat en Afrique: la politique du ventre (Paris, ). Other relevant
works from the same school include Jean-François Bayart, Achille Mbembe and Comi Toulabor,
Religion et moderniteU politique en Afrique noire (Paris, ), and François Constantin and Christian
Coulon (eds.), Religion et transition deUmocratique en Afrique (Paris, ).
"# World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Washington DC, ), p. .
"$ Two bibliographical surveys which include useful references to the literature on governance
are Rob Buijtenhuijs and Elly Rijnierse, Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa –, Research
Reports no. , Afrika-studiecentrum (Leiden, ) ; Rob Buijtenhuijs and Ce! line Thiriot,
Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, – (Leiden, Bordeaux, ).
"% Sally Falk Moore, Anthropology and Africa: changing perspectives on a changing scene
(Charlottesville and London, ), pp. –.
"& An early example of this trend is John Peel, Aladura, a Religious Movement Among the Yoruba
(London, ).
"' Influential examples are Jean Comaroff, Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: the culture and history
of a South African people (Chicago and London, ), and David Lan, Guns and Rain: guerrillas and
spirit mediums in Zimbabwe (London, ).
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At the same time as anthropology has widened its scope, however, it
has often failed to consider the central point of religion, which is, we
have suggested, communication with a perceived spirit world. While
fashions in anthropological analysis of religion come and go – Marxism,
postmodernism, cognitive anthropology – many works on religion in
Africa have in common the implicit supposition that religions are
fallacious as representations of reality."( Some authors go as far as to
consider religious thought a vehicle for almost anything except
religion.") In short, contemporary anthropologists tend to consider
religion as a metaphor expressing other fundamental elements in
human societies. All analysts seem to agree, however, that there has
existed in Africa, for as long as history is able to detect, a widespread
belief in the existence of invisible beings which, to greater or lesser
degree, influence human destiny. Such a belief is widely regarded as a
basic definition of religion."*
One critic, Robin Horton, divides anthropologists of African religion
into three categories : the Symbolists (those who see religion as a form
of representation, comparable to poetry or music) ; the Fideists, ‘who
like to think of all religious life as the expression of an autonomous
commitment to communion with Spiritual Being’, and the Intellec-
tualists, in which category Horton places himself, who understand
religion in Africa as ‘a system of theory and practice guided by the aims
of explanation, prediction and control ’.#! Although there have been
new developments in writing on religion in Africa since Horton first
made these distinctions, his basic categorisation remains a viable one.
Perhaps the main feature of the Intellectualist approach is its propensity
to consider statements on religious matters in the first instance in the
believers’ own terms before attempting to translate these into a
vocabulary more appropriate to other branches of learning. To borrow
a word derived from linguistics, it is useful to describe religions in
‘emic’ terms, that is, those derived from the believers’ own point
of view, before doing so in ‘etic ’, or more detached, terms which
correspond more closely to a Western approach based exclusively on
"( E.g. Maurice Bloch, From Blessing to Violence: history and ideology in the circumcision ritual of the
Merina of Madagascar (Cambridge, ) ; Richard Werbner, Ritual Passage, Sacred Journey: the
process and organisation of a religious movement (Manchester, ) ; Jean and John Comaroff (eds.),
Modernity and its Malcontents: ritual and power in postcolonial Africa (Chicago and London, ) ;
Pascal Boyer (ed.), Cognitive Aspects of Religious Symbolism (Cambridge, ) ; Boyer, The
Naturalness of Religious Ideas: a cognitive theory of religion (Berkeley, CA, ).
") Cf. Jean and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: christianity, colonialism and
consciousness in South Africa (Chicago and London, ).
"* This definition of religion originates with Sir Edward Burnett Tylor (–).
#! Both quotations are from Robin Horton, Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West: essays on
magic, religion and science (Cambridge,  pbk edn), p. .
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the rational method of determining objective truth. It is important to
note that this does not imply that an analyst who adopts the ‘emic’
form of analysis in the first instance has to share the religious beliefs of
the people he or she studies ; it implies only that the observer must
initially suspend judgement by allowing the believers being studied (in
this case Africans) the right to express matters in the terms they think
appropriate. This is the approach which we will follow here.
Modern Africans, then, tend to believe in the existence of invisible
forces which share the world with visible ones and to that extent they
may be described as religious.#" Among the evidence for this assertion
is the rapid growth of movements of religious renewal or revival which
are to be found in all parts of Africa today.## Some dynamic Christian
and Muslim movements are often described as ‘ fundamentalist ’, a term
which has become more misleading than useful and which we will try
to avoid.#$ Among the common characteristics of new religious
movements, including Christian charismatics and Islamists as well as
others, are a highly visible occupation of public space, in the form of
public ceremonies and parades ; a frequent concern with combatting
evil which often takes the form of rooting out perceived impurity; and
a physical multiplication of places of worship such as churches and
mosques which are springing up in bewildering number in towns and
villages throughout the continent. There are entirely new movements
such as the Unification Church or Moonies, introduced from Korea;#%
and there are revivals of traditional forms such as in witch-finding
movements, which have reached epidemic proportions in South
Africa.#& Only in North Africa and Sudan has religious renewal taken
on a distinctly political form in the shape of the well-known Islamist
#" For a discussion of the role of religion in African philosophy, see e.g. Kwame Anthony
Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the philosophy of culture (New York, ), pp. –. That
not all Africans are religious is made clear by E; loi Messi Metogo, Dieu peut-il mourir en Afrique?
Essai sur l’indiffeU rence religieuse et l’incroyance en Afrique noire (Paris, ).
## Reflections on the rise of new religious movements include Bennetta W. Jules-Rosette (ed.),
The New Religions of Africa (Norwood, NJ, ) ; Rosalind Hackett (ed.), New Religious Movements
in Nigeria (Lewiston, NY, ) ; Hackett, ‘Revitalisations in African traditional religion’, in
Jacob Olupona (ed.), African Traditional Religions in Contemporary Society (New York, ), pp.
– ; Hackett, ‘African new religious movements ’, in Ursula King (ed.), Turning Points in
Religious Studies: essays in honour of Geoffrey Parrinder (Edinburgh, ), pp. – ; Paul Gifford,
‘Some recent developments in African Christianity ’, African Affairs, ,  (), –.
#$ For a critique of the notion of fundamentalism, see Gerrie ter Haar, Halfway to Paradise:
African Christians in Europe (Cardiff, ), ch. . We will follow some scholars of Islam in labelling
modern exponents of political Islam as Islamists.
#% On the Moonie presence in Zaı$ re and Angola, see ‘Angola : oily enclave’, Africa Confidential,
,  ( January ), .
#& Isak Niehaus, ‘Witch-hunting and political legitimacy: continuity and change in Green
Valley, Lebowa, – ’, Africa, ,  (), –.
    -  
movements. Elsewhere, Christian and Muslim revivalists and followers
of other movements seek less to create theocracies than to effect a
change of heart in individuals or to purge society of evil and sickness.
However a religious preoccupation with evil is not devoid of political
implications, as we may see by taking some specific examples.
     :     
At this point, we will turn to an example of one of the popular
religious texts referred to in the introduction to this article which
provides an illustration of the belief that the modern world is infested
by witches and other persons who make use of spiritual powers for
malign purposes. In spite of its mystical form, this text is replete with
political meanings due to its preoccupation with the extent of evil in
society.
The text, published in English and Swahili, is by a Congolese
Christian preacher who is well known in the west of the former Zaı$ re.
The preacher, Evangelist Mukendi, tells the story of his life from the
time he was weaned by a mermaid and pledged to Satan by his father,
himself a witch. Mukendi, now born again in Christ, records the
appalling experiences he had in his years as a witch. He describes how
he travelled throughout the witches’ underworld which, he claims,
contains complexes of modern institutions created and used by witches,
including universities and an international airport in Kinshasa. In this
extraordinary treatise on the underworld of sorcery, he records how
‘every town or village in the world has some hidden human activities
under the water nearby’. Here, the spirits of people who in life were
controlled by the fallen angels, the agents of evil, congregate and
communicate with the ‘witch doctors, sorcerers and magicians ’ still
living in the town.#' In their underwater lairs, the agents of the Devil
feast on human flesh. They ‘promote sorcerers, magicians and witch
doctors ’ to high positions in the towns above ground, in the visible
world. They manufacture diabolic objects underground, including
‘cars, clothes, perfumes, money, radios and television sets ’ which they
peddle above ground to try and ‘distort and destroy the lives of those
who purchase such items’. There are even underground scientists
employed by the fallen angels. The ultimate purpose of all satanic
activity of this type is ‘ to steal, kill and destroy’.#( According to
Mukendi, who claims personal experience of these matters, some major
#' D. D. Kaniaki and Evangelist Mukendi, Snatched from Satan’s Claws, p. .
#( Ibid., p. .
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underground cities are located in former Zaı$ re, one near the Inga dam
and another near Matadi. Here there are diabolical underground
conference centres ‘where many decisions affecting the countries and
continent of Africa are effected’. These are on a large highway which
connects them to other parts of Zaı$ re and to the other side of the
Atlantic Ocean.#) Zaı$ re even has a ‘very busy international airport for
all sorts of sorcerers and magicians, flying in and out ’.#* Some of the
users of the witches’ airport are African witches who transform
themselves into white people.
These false white persons will then get out of their ‘‘planes ’’ and enter into
bigger ones awaiting at Mukamba Lake [the international sorcerers’ airport],
destined to Europe, America or any other countries of the world. Their
purpose is to acquire jobs in those countries posing as specialists or expatriates,
to earn big salaries to be used for the international organization of sorcerers
of the world.$!
Mukendi claims to have taken part in such trips while he was a witch.
The witches have a government, organised just like a visible
government except that those in charge are women. There are witches’
universities, with lecturers and staff.
This text is an investigation in religious form and using religious
imagery of a fundamental problem of human life : the meaning of evil.
In some respects it is highly traditional, since in western Zaire, as in
some other parts of Africa, access to the spirit world is often said to pass
through water,$" and the figure of the mermaid or female water-spirit
is a familiar one, which is itself a subject of popular literature and,
increasingly, of academic study.$# Nevertheless, this is by no means a
tale from folklore. On the contrary, it purports to be an autobiography
which represents the agents of the Devil as fully modernised and as
operating in the central institutions of society. They are said to have
their own universities, scientists and airports, and to infiltrate
international organisations. In fact this text comes close to suggesting
that the world of consultants and development experts has been
infiltrated by evil-doers. This may be inferred to include employees of
the World Bank, for example, international experts on Africa par
excellence, who would probably be shocked to know that they are
considered agents of the Evil One.
#) Ibid., p. . #* Ibid., p. . $! Ibid., p. .
$" E.g. Wyatt MacGaffey, Modern Kongo Prophets : religion in a plural society (Bloomington, IN
), pp. –.
$# Cf.Victoria Eto, Exposition on Water Spirits (Nigeria, ) ; Kathleen O’Brien Wicker,
‘Mami water in African religion and spirituality ’, in Jacob K. Olupona and Charles H. Long
(eds.), African Spirituality (forthcoming).
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This is not an isolated example of prophecy, testimony or other
writing in contemporary African religious mode which discusses
manifestations of evil said to infest the main institutions of Africa’s
governance, including heads of state and aid donors. By way of
comparison we may cite the prophecy of a Ghanaian preacher,
Reverend Ernest Pianim, who is well known as the administrator of a
leading Christian charismatic movement in Ghana. Pianim has written
a booklet in which, using the well-known Christian model of the Book
of Revelation, he foresees the rise of Ghana from its current woes after
the reign of the Antichrist. He identifies the Antichrist as none other
than the European Union.$$
Another comparison is a work on demonology published in Nigeria
by a young pentecostal preacher, Reverend S. N. I. Okeke, a university
student of economics. The particular interest of Okeke’s text, for
present purposes, lies in his use of military jargon. Okeke describes in
detail the attempted rebellion by Lucifer, the fallen angel, against God,
whom he refers to as the commander-in-chief of heaven. Jesus he
describes as God’s second-in-command, while Lucifer, before his fall,
had the rank of general officer commanding (GOC) the host of angels.
The following is Okeke’s account of the battle in heaven when Lucifer
launches his coup:$%
The day for the coup came. Lucifer and his followers got more than they
bargained for. Their logistic and strategic plans failed. They were defeated
almost before the coup execution started!
The announcement was brief. A group of dissident angels led by Lucifer, the
commander-in-chief of the heavenly angels, had attempted to overthrow the
kingdom of our Lord. The dissidents have been rounded up. All peace loving
angels should go about their normal duties as every situation is under control.
There would be no need for curfew as all the dissidents were arrested at less
than the first second of the coup. The prince of peace is in firm control of every
situation.
The description is adapted to a Nigerian public only too familiar with
hearing normal radio broadcasts interrupted by martial music and a
coup announcement. The assertion that all evil originated in a military
coup in heaven has rich implications for any reader who contemplates
the origins of the many evils which are so evident in contemporary
Nigeria, whose governments have been often installed through military
coups.
$$ Ernest Pianim, Ghana in Prophecy (Kumasi, ). This view seems to be related to the recent
migration of Ghanaians to Europe.
$% S. N. I. Okeke, Satanic Ministers : the ministries of Lucifer (Lagos, ), p. .
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Evangelist Mukendi’s text from the former Zaı$ re, then, is not unique.
All over Africa there is a flourishing business in the publication of
similar tracts which describe experiences of evil or which deliver
precepts for the combatting of evil. Generally speaking the value of
these accounts lies in the fact that they are first-hand testimonies
produced by Africans for other Africans, rather than the accounts given
to us through the mediation of social science. Here are the voices of at
least some Africans concerning the condition of their societies, or to be
more precise concerning the problem of evil in their societies.
Some analysts may consider expressions such as those briefly cited
here to be metaphors, but the writers of such texts clearly do not. They
do not regard the spirit world as a metaphor for the ‘real ’ or visible
world, but as an integral part of reality, in fact its most important part.
In this sense the evolving political language of Africa tends to regard
politics as a metaphor for movements in a spirit world rather than vice
versa. Evangelist Mukendi and comparable authors believe that the
ultimate cause of human suffering lies in the spirit world. By the same
standard, they also believe that the eventual source of human prosperity
is situated in that same place. Indeed this is the main purpose of
religious communication, such as prayer or other forms of ritual
behaviour, which is intended to persuade beings in the spirit world to
grant the supplicant’s wishes. Those who claim to know the world of
spirits may therefore suggest in all seriousness that what is required is
an alliance of forces – governments, priests and healers – to combat evil
on the plane where it operates, which is a spiritual one. The logic of
their argument is that African societies will not find stability unless they
find spiritual stability. Hence active debates on the nature of evil take
place at all levels of society in Africa in a form which most Europeans
or North Americans would regard as religious. This is reflected not only
in the views of authors such as Mukendi, Pianim and Okeke, but also
in those of leading politicians and their constituents. An interesting
example is Kenya, whose head of state, Daniel arap Moi, established a
presidential commission to inquire into the Cult of Devil Worship.
President Moi, however, refused to publish the report of this body
although he did attack the activities of Satanists in his country,
implying that they were to be found in the ranks of opposition parties.$&
Meanwhile, some Kikuyu were convinced that the real location of
Satanism was in the government itself.$'
$& Africa Research Bulletin, ,  (), a.
$' Yann Droz, ‘Si Dieu veut…ou suppo# ts de Satan? Incertitudes, mille!narisme et sorcellerie
chez les migrants kikuyu’, Cahiers des eU tudes africaines, ,  (), –.
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Religion and politics have been linked throughout African history.
In all known pre-colonial African political systems and states public
religious performance played an important role. Perhaps it should be
said at once, then, that since there is no reason to suppose that religious
belief has ever declined in Africa, it is incorrect to speak of a revival. It
would be most accurate to refer to the revival of public religion, or the
revival of religion in the occupation of political space. Many of the most
dynamic expressions of religious activity at present take the form of the
renewal of Islam, most obviously in North Africa, sometimes inspired
by Muslims who have studied in the Middle East or fought in
Afghanistan and have returned home full of zeal to create a new
political order. In Christian communities, such expressions often take
the form of born-again movements which reflect the remarkable
growth of pentecostalism worldwide.$( In some places there is a
noticeable renewal of traditional religion, such as in southern Nigeria.$)
Whatever the precise form this new religious dynamism takes, it is a
tendency so marked as to require some explanation. This demands
some prior consideration of the nature of religious belief in Africa in
relation to public power.
In many societies of pre-colonial Africa rulers were endowed with
sacred duties, such as causing rain to fall and crops to grow, and charged
with upholding the cosmic order generally. In such societies any major
disorder in the invisible sphere was held to have a probable or even an
inevitable effect on the physical fortunes of the community of believers.
By the same token, any major event, such as a war, a famine or an
untimely death, was believed to have its root cause in the invisible
world. Even in the so-called stateless societies of old Africa, where
village chiefs or councils of elders were responsible for the routine
administration of government, real public authority actually lay with
ritual experts who mediated between the visible and invisible worlds.
An example of this is the Poro society of Sierra Leone, Guinea and
Liberia.$* Even in North Africa temporal rulers were expected to
possess baraka, a power which came from the invisible world and which
alone would ensure worldly success. In Madagascar a similar quality
$( Martin, Tongues of Fire.
$) Hackett, ‘Revitalisations in African traditional religion’.
$* Kenneth Little, ‘The political function of the Poro’, Africa, ,  (), –, and , 
(), –.
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associated with the spiritual aspect of public power was (and still is)
called hasina.
The connection between religion and politics or between religion
and concepts of the state is thus rooted in history. The particular form
which this takes varies from place to place, according to particular
history, culture and circumstances. It is possible, and even necessary, to
consider the connection between politics and religion partly in
mechanical or managerial terms, since this is a large part of the actual
stuff of politics. It is clear that, all over the continent, political elites
make use of religious communities for purposes of mobilising voters,
creating clienteles or organising constituencies. There are numerous
examples. It is easy for us to understand why South Africa’s President
P. W. Botha should wish to address the Easter gathering of the Zion
Christian Church in , or why some years later the same event was
attended by F. W. de Klerk, Nelson Mandela and Chief M. G.
Buthelezi, all competing for political support. In Senegal, the influence
wielded by marabouts or Islamic holy men belonging to the main Sufi
brotherhoods has been recognised as a source of political influence for
decades.%! During the liberation war in Zimbabwe, the advice of
mediums said to be possessed by the spirits of ancestors played a vital
role in securing the support of the population.%" These brief references
are only some of the very many cases in which religion has served as a
vehicle of political mobilisation. But if powerful temporal rulers can
make use of religious clientelism, it is also the case that they can become
alarmed by religious leaders who become too popular, as has happened
in Zambia, for example, on more than one occasion.%#
There is nothing peculiar to Africa about politicians seeking to make
political capital out of displays of religious allegiance or respect.
Politicians in almost every part of the world sometimes visit places of
worship, especially during election campaigns, for the purpose of
winning votes. This does not mean that they are necessarily believers
themselves. In Africa, however, unlike in Europe or North America,
there is reason to believe that political elites do not use religion solely
as a means of increasing their base of popular support but that in many
cases they also believe that access to the spiritual world is a vital
resource in the constant struggle to secure advantage over their rivals
in political in-fighting. This can be done by conventional techniques of
%! Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, Saints and Politicians: essays in the organisation of a Senegalese peasant
society (Cambridge,). %" Lan, Guns and Rain.
%# Hugo Hinfelaar, Bemba-Speaking Women of Zambia in a Century of Religious Change (–)
(Leiden, ).
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communication with the spirit world, including the use of sacrifices and
protective objects or through divination. President Fe! lix Houphoue$ t-
Boigny, widely considered one of the most successful and enlightened
African heads of state and known as a staunch Catholic, used such
methods in private throughout his career.%$ Only in his last years,
however, when he devoted enormous resources to the construction of
the great basilica in his home town of Yamoussoukro which was
designed to perpetuate his power over generations as yet unborn, did
his spiritual preoccupations become fully public.%%
Many other heads of state are known to employ religious experts in
their personal entourage to whom they turn for advice on matters far
removed from what, in modern Western thought, would be considered
religious affairs. Kenneth Kaunda, for example, when he was president
of Zambia, retained the services of an Indian guru, Dr Ranganathan,
whom he consulted on a wide range of issues and whom he
recommended to those within his immediate circle.%& A more
controversial choice was that of President Mathieu Ke! re! kou of Benin,
who retained the services of Mohamed Amadou Cisse! , nicknamed
‘Djine’ or ‘ the Devil ’, a Malian marabout who was known to have
held a ceremony in which he publicly espoused the Devil,%' and who
had previously worked for other heads of state including President
Mobutu of Zaı$ re and President Bongo of Gabon. Cisse! was appointed
a minister of state in the Beninese government, responsible for the secret
services. He was eventually convicted of fraud in a major trial.%( Other
heads of state have founded esoteric cults which play an important role
in rituals for their inner circle, such as President Didier Ratsiraka of
Madagascar, whose palace included an extravagant temple dedicated
to Rosicrucianism,%) President Paul Biya of Cameroon, also a
Rosicrucian,%* and President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, a
follower of Transcendental Meditation.&! While it is good politics for a
politician to make a public profession of religious allegiance in order to
%$ Jacques Baulin, La politique inteU rieure d’HouphoueX t-Boigny (Paris, ), pp. –.
%% Samba Diarra, Les faux complots d’HouphoueX t-Boigny (Paris, ), pp. –.
%& Beatwell Chisala, The Downfall of President Kaunda (Lusaka, ), pp. –.
%' Personal communication by Tie!bile! Drame! , former minister of the Malian government.
%( Maurice Chabi, Banqueroute, mode d’emploi: un marabout dans les griffes de la maffia beUninoise (Porto
Novo, no date).
%) Personal communication by Solofo Randrianja, historian at the University of Tamatave.
%* Jean-François Bayart, ‘L’Afrique invisible ’, Politique internationale,  (), –. Claude
Wauthier, ‘L’e! trange influence des franc-maçons en Afrique francophone’, Le monde diplomatique,
 (Sept. ), –, mentions the competition between Rosicrucianism and Freemasonry for
the allegiance of francophone heads of state.
&! This was widely reported in the Dutch press when the Mozambican government negotiated
an arrangement with a TM foundation in the Netherlands.
      
win popularity, there is thus abundant evidence that heads of state also
practice religion in private for no obvious clientelist motive. Quite
simply, they, like most of their constituents, believe that real power has
its roots in the invisible world and that therefore the cultivation of
spiritual power is vital for their continued political existence.
Heads of state with spiritual advisors or private cults appear to
believe that the weight of the affairs of state requires them to have
access to esoteric forms of power from which the mass of the population
is excluded. All elites tend to cultivate their own exclusive institutions,
in Africa and elsewhere, in which they may socialise with their peers.
African heads of state, the evidence suggests, tend to believe in the
importance of the invisible world just as their subjects do, but seek
higher forms of power commensurate with the importance of the
positions they seek to defend and of the burdens which they have to
discharge. It is common to tenure of great power in all cultures that it
imposes on its holders choices weightier than those facing most of their
subjects, and that this takes power-holders into an exclusive moral
realm.
In fact, the religious practices of the mighty in Africa, esoteric
though they might be, are usually known to the population. In the days
before press freedom became general in the continent in the s, elite
activities of this sort were favourite subjects of popular debate through
radio trottoir.&" Ordinary people understand well enough the role played
by religion in elite struggles since many use techniques similar to those
of their leaders to solve the problems of their daily lives by consulting
healers, spirit mediums, priests, prophets, diviners and marabouts, by
seeking the blessing of the ancestors or by attending religious services
of every variety.
One consequence of the frequency with which members of the elite
seek advice on their most intimate spiritual problems is that those
marabouts and other spiritual experts who include politicians among
their clientele themselves become brokers of power in the most
mundane sense. The marabouts of the elite become repositories of
highly confidential information, since those politicians who resort to
their services will divulge their innermost ambitions in a bid to attain
the power they crave. In this way a leading marabout may acquire
inside knowledge of planned coups and other secrets of his elite clients,
&" On radio trottoir in general, Stephen Ellis, ‘Tuning in to Pavement Radio’, African Affairs, ,
 (), –. For a specific case, Sabakinu Kivilu, ‘Le radio-trottoir dans l’exercice du
pouvoir politique au Zaı$ re ’, in B. Jewsiewicki and H. Moniot (eds.), Dialoguer avec le leU opard?
(Paris, ), pp. –.
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as did Amadou Cisse! in Benin. Another marabout, Amadou Oumarou
‘Bonkano’, also the chief of a national intelligence service, himself
attempted a coup against his patron and employer, President Seyni
Kountche! of Niger.&# In fact a spiritual expert who is frequented by
members of the elite bears a close resemblance to the head of an
intelligence service because of the confidential information he acquires.
Thus a ruler who takes such a person into his service acquires access to
a valuable source of worldly information as well as to invisible power.
By the same token a ruler who refuses to frequent such people deprives
himself of a vital source of information and of the influence of a
perceived medium of supernatural power. This was one of the reasons,
for example, for the downfall of Benin’s President Nice!phore Soglo and
the astonishing political comeback of Mathieu Ke! re! kou, the born-
again Christian who was once considered by certain of his countrymen
as a Satanist.&$
If the spiritual experts who frequent the palaces of the elite acquire
worldly power through their activities, so in a different way do those
popular religious leaders who acquire mass followings. Leading priests
and prophets become important people in a political sense simply by
reason of the number of their followers. They are not the only leaders
from what is fashionably called civil society who may become influential
by heading some sort of non-government association such as a
professional association or a trade union. However, the influence
wielded by a popular religious leader in Africa is different in many
respects from that exercised by any other leader emerging from the
non-state sector. A trade union leader, for example, may be able to
articulate demands for higher wages or more jobs which a government
can deal with by the conventional techniques of modern government
and politics. A religious leader, on the other hand, is endowed with
powerperceived as stemmingdirectly from the spiritualworld, reflecting
a world view which is foreign to norms of government based on the
classical Western separation of religion and politics into distinct systems
of thought and action. The leader of a secular organisation may be
placated with gifts of patronage or intimidated with the threat of
exclusion or the application of coercion, but a president finds it more
difficult to identify techniques for dealing with, for example, an
epidemic of possession by evil spirits.
&# Robert B. Charlick, Niger: personal rule and survival in the Sahel (Boulder, ), pp. –.
&$ Camilla Strandsbjerg, ‘Religion and the interpretation of political power: aspects of political
thinking in Benin’, paper presented at the conference on Religion and Politics in Africa and the
Islamic World, University of Copenhagen, – Oct. .
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Temporal rulers attempting to govern populations who believe that
their daily life is affected by powers stemming from the invisible lack
institutional means of control. When the Zambian Catholic Archbishop
Emmanuel Milingo carried out his healing ministry by exorcising evil
spirits and calling upon the Holy Spirit to fill his parishioners, he was
mediating invisible powers believed by Zambians to exist but over
which the recognised political authorities of the country had no
control. In the end this caused such political disquiet as to cause
President Kaunda to become an accomplice to Milingo’s removal by
the Vatican.&% Spiritual leaders who develop a mass following in this
way are particularly difficult for governments to deal with, even when
they have no political ambitions. Even if religious leaders do aspire to
play a role in government, they find it difficult to acquire political
power on the basis of a purely spiritual authority. This may be one
explanation why so many of the national conferences held in Africa in
the early s chose bishops as their presidents, people who could
appeal to sources of power unavailable to discredited politicians but
were unlikely to turn their office into the base for a presidential
campaign.&&
Even in the heyday of one-party states, when heads of state
controlled virtually every organ of associational life, the spirit world
was always more elusive. Some rulers, like Presidents Mobutu of
Zaı$ re&' or Eyadema of Togo,&( established quasi-religious cults of their
own in what it is permissible to interpret as an attempt to revive systems
of sacred kingship, but always with limited or short-lived success. For
while secular government and politics may be managed with
appropriate doses of patronage and coercion, the spiritual world is less
easy to govern, particularly in a continent where belief in prophecy and
spirit possession is widespread and where access to spiritual power is
believed to be within the reach of all. In principle anyone can
communicate with the world of the spirits and receive messages from
that source. People believed to be possessed by spirits, prophets with
privileged access to the spirit world, or people who use potent
instruments of religious communication to express their wishes and
aspirations all have access to power in a form which may pay little
&% Gerrie ter Haar, Spirit of Africa: the healing ministry of Archbishop Milingo of Zambia (London,
), pp. –.
&& Metena M’Nteba, ‘Les confe! rences nationales africaines et la figure politique de l’e! ve# que-
pre! sident ’, ZaıX re-Afrique,  (), –.
&' Allen F. Roberts, ‘L’authenticite! , l’alie!nation et l’homicide: une e! tude sur le processus social
dans les zones rurales au Zaı$ re ’, in Jewsiewicki and Moniot, Dialoguer avec le leU opard?, pp. –.
&( Comi Toulabor, Le Togo sous EyadeUma (Paris, ), esp. pp. –.
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respect to the social or political norms in vogue. This poses a constant
threat to the ideological order and thus to political stability. This was
also the case in colonial times, as many examples testify.&) It is not a
peculiarity of recent decades.
  
Religious revival movements of various sorts have had an increasing
impact in the public realm of many African countries over the last
twenty years. This roughly coincides with a decline of the formal
apparatuses of state and government over the same period. The same
period has also witnessed an explosion of the type of popular religious
literature which we have earlier discussed. While it would be too simple
to regard this as a simple case of cause and effect, there are reasons to
believe that these two factors are connected.
Africa, of course, is not alone in seeing the emergence of new religious
movements in the last two decades, some of which have become
political forces, as examples from Asia and America will testify.&* Hence
it would not be correct to argue that new religious movements have
emerged in Africa solely in order to fill a vacuum in public life.
Moreover, dynamic new political movements have emerged also in
African countries where the state cannot be said to be heading towards
crisis, such as South Africa. Our observation is simply that such
religious movements are rarely devoid of political implication and that
when they do emerge in a country where the state is unable to fulfil its
expected functions in regard to the law and public order, religion can
take on a specific importance.
Before examining this matter further, it is useful to dwell briefly on
the travails of African states and the ways in which these are normally
described. Probably the most influential analyses of the malaise of
African states, which has been increasingly evident since the early
s, have been in the field of economics. This is partly a reflection of
the fact that the dominant academic mode of contemplating Africa in
the years since independence has been in terms of economic
development. More specifically, the World Bank and the International
&) A good example is Simon Kimbangu, concerning whom see Marie-Louise Martin,
Kimbangu: an African prophet and his church (Oxford, ). Karen E. Fields, Revival and Rebellion in
Colonial Central Africa (Princeton, ) studies the reaction of colonial administrations to a range
of spiritual movements.
&* Examples include the role of the Unification Church in Korea, the rise of the Religious Right
in the United States and the establishment of an Islamic government in Iran.
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Monetary Fund, both of which are dominated by economists, have
acquired enormous weight in African affairs since .'! These
institutions have produced an important corpus of literature on Africa
and have had a substantial influence on the way in which the
continent’s public life is analysed both in the academic world and by
policy-makers. Today, inasmuch as the industrialised world has a
coherent view of Africa, it is that African countries need to enact
political reforms which will create public institutions better able to
design and implement rational policies conducive to stability and
economic growth.
The institutions of state which have decayed so markedly in Africa
in the last two decades, and which the major donors are now struggling
to restore to working order, are those originally established by
European colonial powers in conformity with the norms applying in
Europe itself at the time.'" Briefly, colonial administrators supposed
that government should be through modern, bureaucratic organs of a
state of which the proper function is to uphold a rational system of law
and to design and implement rational policies. These policies, generally
speaking, depend on material inputs of resources for the satisfaction of
specific aims deemed to be in the common good. The identification of
this common good is made, in the last resort, by political authorities. In
the colonial times these were situated in European metropoles but these
days they are located in Africa’s capital cities. It is noteworthy that this
conception of government introduced in colonial times is almost
identical to the concept of ‘good governance’ so much in vogue among
donors today.
The religious revival in Africa can be said to reflect a concern with
poor governance, expressed in a different idiom, inasmuch as new
religious movements are often centrally concerned with the problem of
evil in society and are looking for alternative sources of power. Even in
countries with states which remain strong, the emergence of new
religious movements can reasonably be seen as attempts to locate new
sources or forms of power. In effect, many forms of religious revival
challenge the very bases of legitimacy of states which operate through
institutions and norms of governance originally created in colonial
times. In this regard Islam, unlike Christianity, offers a specific view of
'! This was the date of application of the first Structural Adjustment Programme, concerning
Senegal.
'" For a statement of these norms, expressed by a leading theorist who was writing at precisely
the time such institutions were being introduced in Africa, see Max Weber (ed. Max Rheinstein),
Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge, MA, ).
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government in the form of theocracy. In general, many new religious
movements in Africa can be seen as attempts to revive a known source
of power. Spiritual power, unlike political power, is situated not in
institutions themselves, nor in the will of the people, but in the world
of the invisible.
It is helpful to consider the revival of religion in relation to the
dysfunction of states in this light. In the large number of African
examples where religion is strong and states prove unable or unwilling
to uphold a monopoly of violence or the rule of law, spiritual belief
offers access to an alternative form of power and provides a social
cement. In this sense the resurgence of religion is directly connected to
the erosion of secular state apparatuses in cases where the latter has
occurred. This may be described as the revival of tradition in a radically
changed context. Unlike in pre-colonial times, every part of Africa is
now directly linked via money economies to world markets and via
electronic media to world sources of information. It is striking that the
present forms of religious revival are generally those of the world
religions of Islam and Christianity, which thus link Africa to worldwide
cultural systems. They also reflect the literacy which is now widespread
in Africa where, less than a century ago, it was rare indeed.
Religion and politics are both systems of ordering the power inherent
in human society, in the process of which elements of authority and
hierarchy tend to emerge. As such, religion and politics are closely
related. In the modern Western tradition these two systems of
harnessing or manipulating power have been subject to sharp
organisational and intellectual distinctions which conform to the
separation of politics and religion or church and state. Colonial
governors and missionaries attempted to reorganise the language of
power into similar political and religious idioms. However, it is clear
that a large number of the world’s people continue to regard these two
spheres of power as impinging upon one another or even, in some
circumstances, of being virtually indistinct from one another. This is
true not only of Africa but also for example of China, which has a long
tradition of religious risings intended to rid the empire of demonic
influence at times of acute disorder.'# Thus, while the present essay
concentrates on Africa, our observations may be situated in a broader
debate on the way in which many peoples in what used to be called the
Third World are reordering the systems by which power is acquired
and distributed in their societies in the aftermath of a century and more
'# W. J. F. Jenner, The Tyranny of History: the roots of China’s crisis (London, ), pp. –.
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of subjection to institutions originally imposed on them by Europeans
or otherwise acquired as a result of Western influence.'$
    
Power is usually defined as the ability of a person to induce others to
act in the way that he or she requires.'% Many writers throughout
history have expressed the conviction that the possession of great power
tempts its holders to immorality or at the very least confronts them with
dilemmas which require them to make profound choices concerning
good and evil, normally considered the prerogative of gods. Or, as
Nietzsche noted, ‘every high degree of power always involves a
corresponding degree of freedom from good and evil ’.'&
Politicians, being powerful, have the capacity to make choices of
great consequence, and the less they are trammelled by constitutions or
some other apparatus of restraint, the more dangerous this can be.
However, there is evidence from different parts of Africa that the
relative latitude enjoyed by the powerful in this respect is merely a
reflection of a much wider confusion concerning public institutions
regarded as having the legitimate authority to regulate power in both
the political and religious spheres. In the absence of such institutions
the abuse of political and religious power can create moral confusion
and even panic. In small communities, such as a village or a family, this
may take the form of witchcraft accusations,'' but related forms of
moral confusion may occur in a larger community, even within a
nation.'( Distinguishing between good and evil and understanding the
nature of evil are major preoccupations of the popular religious tracts
to which we have referred throughout the present text.
Modern Africa in many cases lacks entrenched protocols of power in
both the political and the spiritual fields. To take a common enough
'$ Jean-François Bayart, ‘L’historicite! de l’e! tat importe! ’, in J-.F. Bayart (ed.), La greffe de l’Etat
(Paris, ), pp. –.
'% Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass (eds.), The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought
(London, ), p. .
'& F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, quoted in The Penguin Dictionary of Political Quotations
(Harmondsworth, ), p. .
'' Ineke van Kessel, ‘ ‘‘From Confusion to Lusaka’’ : the youth revolt in Sekhukhuneland’,
Journal of Southern African Studies, ,  (), –.
'( Peter Geschiere, Sorcellerie et politique au Cameroun: la viande des autres (Paris, ), pp. –,
describes how villagers may perceive national political problems as a form of witchcraft. For a
discussion of the idea of spirit possession on a national scale, Gerrie ter Haar and Stephen Ellis,
‘Spirit possession and healing in modern Zambia: an analysis of letters to Archbishop Milingo’,
African Affairs, ,  (), –. Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: war, youth and
resources in Sierra Leone (London and Portsmouth, NH, ), pp. xxiv–xxv, sees fear of cannibalism
as a form of similar moral panic on a national scale.
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example, a politician who arrives in power unconstitutionally through
a coup d’eU tat may emerge as a generally benign ruler, but it is more likely
that he will not, since experience shows that the use of illegitimate
violence in the formative act of taking power may well lead to the
commission of further acts of violence in its exercise. Similarly the
purpose of religious performance may not be clear until its results
become apparent in the absence of a generally acknowledged structure
of religious authority. Just as a politician who proclaims himself to be
the saviour of the nation may turn out to be no such thing, so may a
self-proclaimed prophet or healer turn out to be a charlatan or to bring
disaster in their wake.')
In popular imagery evil-doers are often associated with small,
exclusive and secret groups which perform their actions at night, one of
the perceived characteristics of witches. Just as political and religious
power are comparable, so too are the actions of covens of witches and
exclusive groups of plotters and putschists. Their exclusivity and
selfishness are signs of their evil intentions. In Zaı$ re, for example, the
government of President Mobutu was sometimes considered to be an
elite conspiracy of witches, who consulted marabouts of sinister
reputation at night in an effort to enhance their power.'*
In view of this, it is relevant to discuss why certain heads of state have
consciously sought recourse to individual experts, or to cults, widely
believed in Africa to be fundamentally evil in origin, such as
Rosicrucianism.(! The answer seems to lie in the precariousness of
power in Africa. A ruler who has struggled and fought, often literally,
to achieve power, and who is conscious of the danger of violent
overthrow, is even more likely than a constitutional ruler to require
special power to survive. In such conditions any source of additional
power becomes attractive. In many traditional African religions instant
earthly power is believed to be obtainable through sacrifices, by the
spilling of blood. In the Christian tradition the ultimate source of all
power lies with God. However, the granting of earthly power and
wealth is also considered one of the principal assets of the Devil, the
incarnation of evil. One of the effects of Christian evangelisation in
Africa has been to demonise certain traditional religious beliefs,
notably concerning blood sacrifice. Hence, the spilling of blood for
') A good example appears to be the Ugandan prophetess Alice Lakwena. Tim Allen,
‘Understanding Alice : Uganda’s Holy Spirit Movement in context ’, Africa, ,  (), –.
'* Jean-Pierre Diamani, ‘L’humour politique au Phare du Zaı$ re ’, Politique africaine,  (),
–.
(! P. F. Bradford, D. J. Williams, Y. Pwol, C. H. Cheal and T. B. Dankwa, The Christian
Attitude: witchcraft and charms, drinking, cults, marxist socialism, sickness (Achimota, Ghana, ), pp.
–, is a popular work which explicitly labels Rosicrucianism as a devilish cult.
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whatever purpose has in many places become associated with evil,
considered to be the realm of Satan. Since God, the source of all good,
is deemed by Christians to grant power only in his own time and for
benign purposes, a politician desperate for instant power and wealth
may see little alternative other than to perform an act which will be
widely viewed as diabolic, and whose consequences may therefore be
anticipated as malign. The former archbishop of Lusaka, Emmanuel
Milingo, one of Africa’s leading demonologists,(" records that he has
often been approached by politicians who have literally made diabolic
pacts in order to secure the earthly wealth and power which Satan can
bestow in return for possession of a supplicant’s soul.(#
We have noted that the academic literature on Africa in recent years
has been dominated by studies of the deficiencies of public life and
public institutions, and that these analyses have generally been written
in the idiom appropriate to such academic disciplines as economics or
political science. There is reason to believe that many Africans, in
pondering questions regarding the vagaries of power, phrase the
question and its response in a religious idiom in preference to, or in
addition to, the idiom of conventional Western discourse. This becomes
particularly clear in the idiom of witchcraft, as may be seen in both
academic and popular literature. Many modern Cameroonians, for
example, have come to the conclusion that the rapidity with which
political careers rise and fall is explicable only by reference to
witchcraft.($ Both during and since the colonial period many countries
have witnessed witch-finding movements inspired by a widespread
belief that witches are at large and that, since the government offers no
solution or may be itself infested with witches who have grown powerful
and rich on their illegitimate assumption of power, ordinary people
must improvise their own defence.
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In discussing this matter, we encounter a difficult semantic problem.
While the vocabulary applied to religion in the modern English
language is reasonably adequate for technical descriptions of prayer or
ritual, it is inadequate for discussion of more subjective matters such as
the positive or negative, or good or evil, purposes of religious action.
Writers are obliged to have recourse to terms such as ‘witchcraft ’ and
(" Emmanuel Milingo, Face to Face with the Devil (Victoria, Australia ).
(# Emmanuel Milingo, Plunging into Darkness (Victoria, Australia ).
($ Geschiere, Sorcellerie et politique, pp. –.
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‘ sorcery’ to describe ideas whose fluidity and nuances may be
significantly different in African languages and African thought.(%
Even ritual experts schooled in the Western tradition, such as priests
and theologians trained in missionary seminaries, seem to experience
difficulty in articulating religious experience in terms which are
familiar to African worshippers. This is certainly an important reason
why, in Christian communities in Africa, there has been a marked
movement away from the missionary-instituted or mainline churches
towards African-initiated ones.(& A major attraction of African-
initiated churches is the fact that these churches openly address
matters of spirit possession, spiritual subversion or witchcraft, and
healing. In this regard the career of Archbishop Milingo is both
significant and exemplary. Milingo’s success, and his downfall, were his
ability to articulate people’s problems in terms which they understood
exactly. In the classical Western lexicon, some of these problems might
be termed medical, others psychological, and others political or
economic. Milingo was able to address all of these in a religious idiom
of words and action.(' There are many other examples of religious
healers or prophets who have been successful in addressing what we
might regard as political or economic or even military problems by
religious discourse and action. The Naprama cult of counter-violence
in Mozambique was, at least for a brief period, an effective antidote to
the cult of violence espoused by RENAMO.(( Economic problems
caused by drought have also given rise to religious movements whose
object is to make rain fall, one of the duties expected of public
authorities in traditional cosmology but also in modern ones, in
Mozambique for example.()
Some leading authors have contemplated the formation of idioms or
systems of discourse which are, or can be, effective in African politics
as ‘a generalizing and productive political language’.(* Such a
language is in fact emerging in the idiom of religion. This is particularly
(% Ibid., pp. –, and pp. –. A further useful survey of the literature on witchcraft is
Simeon Mesaki, ‘The evolution and essence of witchcraft in pre-colonial African societies ’,
Transafrican Journal of History,  (), –. The originator of much of the vocabulary in use
is Edward Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (st edn  ; reprint
Oxford, ), pp. –.
(& Cf. Arthur F. Kulah, Theological Education in Liberia: problems and opportunities (Lithonia, GA,
), esp. pp. –. (' Ter Haar, Spirit of Africa.
(( K. B. Wilson, ‘Cults of violence and counter-violence in Mozambique’, Journal of Southern
African Studies, ,  (), –. A general survey of traditional religion and warfare is
Stephen L. Weigert, Traditional Religion and Guerrilla Warfare in Modern Africa (New York, ).
() Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique (London, ), p. .
(* Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: conflict in Kenya and Africa (London, ),
p. .
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apparent in the case of born-again Christians who seek to change
society by transforming every individual, and Islamists who aspire to
do the same by creating a theocracy. Both Christian and Muslim
movements of renewal have important antecedents in African history
but they often consciously reject many of their own country’s religious
traditions, considering them at best as irrelevant to their project or at
worst as so much evidence of the Devil’s work. Many Christian
revivalist movements today, while they appear to some observers as
pure American imports,)! are more accurately seen as simply the latest
generation in the century-old tradition of African-initiated churches,
all of which may be located in the longer history of evangelicalism.
Many of these new churches regard the older generation of ‘ spiritual ’
or ‘white garment’ churches as following practices drawn from
traditional African religions which they associate with the work of the
Devil. This is a sign of just how preoccupied they are with combatting
evil. Similar generational trends are observable in Islam, whose current
reforming zeal in Africa may be usefully compared with the nineteenth-
century revival movements of Usman dan Fodio and El Hajj Omar.
African Islam has been subject to periodic waves of renewal,
particularly in West Africa where missionaries with purified beliefs
acquired in foreign centres of Islamic learning have preached reform,
sometimes combined, as in northern Nigeria, with the construction of
new political systems.)"
Modern religious radicals often argue in favour of a break with
popular practices of combining imported and indigenous religious
traditions. In doing this, such radicals are also making a statement
about the way in which public power should be organised and about
the immorality of present systems. They aim to cut through the
prevailing moral confusion by making a clear distinction between what
they perceive as good and what they perceive as evil. In effect they are
attempting to construct a new and simplified system of belief out of the
mass of traditions and institutions existing in Africa by reinterpreting
life in dualistic categories. They are proposing a new basis for the
legitimacy of public power, including that exercised by a state. Hence it
is small wonder that many leaders, whether declaring themselves to be
born again in Christ like Zambia’s President Frederick Chiluba or
Benin’s President Ke! re! kou, or whether by multiplying the outward
signs of personal piety like almost all the leaders of the continent,
)! Gifford, The Religious Right.
)" H. A. S. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto (London, ), pp. –.
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attempt to bestow religious legitimacy on themselves. In countries
where the state apparatus has been eroded to an alarming degree, such
as Congo, Somalia, Sierra Leone and others, religious movements in
the long term may offer not just a new basis for legitimising power,
but even a means of restructuring some sort of apparatus which will
fulfil the functions of government.
There is a risk that, if the process of turning religion into an idiom
of politics develops along the present lines, African politics will become
increasingly incomprehensible to outsiders. Discourses on witchcraft
and on the unseen world of evil, like that of Evangelist Mukendi, who
declares himself to have been saved from Satan by the power of Christ,
may be relevant to many Africans but they are not easily understood
by others. A challenge to Africans is to develop a new language of
politics which incorporates the role of public authorities as upholders of
cosmic order while also being comprehensible internationally. The
challenge to academics is to understand this language of public affairs
not as a symptom of a new form of exoticism, but as a debate on the
proper function of power in Africa.)#
)# On exoticism in African studies, see Christian Coulon, ‘L’exotisme peut-il e# tre banal?
L’expe! rience de Politique africaine’, Politique africaine,  (), –.
